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Reputation Management in Societal Security – A Comparative Study 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
Societal security poses fundamental challenges for the doctrines of accountability and 
transparency in government. At least some of the national security state’s effectiveness 
requires a degree of non-transparency, raising questions about legitimacy. This paper explores 
in cross-national and cross-sectoral perspective, how organisations seek to manage their 
reputation by accounting for their activities.. This article contributes in three main ways. First, 
it highlights how distinct tasks facilitate and constrain certain reputation management 
strategies. Second, it suggests that these reputational considerations shape the way in which 
organisations can give account. Third, it considers three domains associated with societal 
security, namely intelligence, flood defence and food safety in five European countries with 
different state traditions - the UK, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. By using a “web 
census”, this article investigates cross-sectoral and cross-national variation in the way 
organisations seek to account for their activities and manage their reputation. This article 
finds variation across tasks to be more dominant than national variation. 
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Reputation Management in Societal Security – A Comparative Study 
 
Introduction 
Societal security encompasses a wide variety of activities, involving public, para-public and 
private organizations. Whether it is areas of intelligence (espionage), protection from natural 
hazards, such as flooding, or the integrity of basic infrastructures, such as food supply chains, 
at the heart of societal security is the ambition to maintain ‘order’. While constitutional 
arrangements, organizational structures, tasks and standard operating procedures are likely to 
differ considerably across the different fields that encompass societal security (Christensen et 
al. 2016), organisations operating in this broad field face a particular challenge: on the one 
hand, some of their operations require a certain degree of secrecy in order to maintain 
operational integrity; on the other hand, these organizations require legitimacy in order to 
undertake their activities, which can be achieved both in an instrumental and symbolic way 
(Brunsson 1989). This latter aspect has arguably become more prominent in light of the 
growing demand for ‘transparency’ (Picci 2015).  
This article considers how public organizations operating in the different areas of 
societal security seek to sustain a reputation for transparency in order to gain trust from their 
environment (Wæraas and Maor 2015). In particular, it focuses the public-facing activities of 
these organizations, i.e. what these organizations communicate across different types of 
(social) media. In communicating with their environment, organizations employ a variety of 
symbols that could be specific and targeted on the one hand (van Riel and Fombrun 2007), 
and “at-large” and of broad appeal on the other (Røvik 2002). These symbols are likely to 
connect to other forms of account-giving and holding, regardless of whether this involves 
political, administrative/judicial or professional forms of accountability (Bovens 2007). 
Societal security is a new term in the area of public administration. It denotes the increasing 
merger of activities that used to be organised on strictly separate lines, namely civil protection 
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activities on the hand, and police and military protection on the other. One of the indicators of 
this development is the trend towards national risk registers as well as the use of similar 
organisational 'situation rooms' and other crisis management procedures.  
This article contributes in three main ways. First, it considers how reputation 
management across government agencies is shaped by tasks and context. Second, we suggest 
that these reputational considerations shape the way in which government agencies give 
account. This article is about investigating aspects of ‘social accountability’ (Schillemans 
2008). “Social accountability” refers to account-giving to the public at large which include 
mandatory requirements and voluntary initiatives to give account (see also Koop 2014). 
Third, we explore these two advances in the ‘hard' case of societal security organisations in 
three domains - intelligence, flood defence and flooding, in five European countries, 
Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden and UK. By using a web-census the empirical focus 
will be on how societal security-related organizations seek to manage their reputation by 
giving account of their activities. In doing so, they rely on symbols in order to address both 
internal and external audiences. This article focuses on the way agencies display such 
symbols to enhance their reputation, we are therefore not interested in how successful these 
agencies are in the eyes of the recipients - we also do not take a distinct position as to whether 
the deployment of distinct symbols represent meaningful engagement or whether they should 
be regarded as “double talk” and “hypocrisy”. Even if there is a diagnosed decoupling 
between the ways in which organisations talk and how they act (Brunsson 1989), then these 
symbols have nevertheless certain performative impacts. Any organisation will suffer distress 
if this decoupling is going to far - either because of internal disputes, or by the growing divide 
between organisational practice and the externally held expectations of interested audiences 
(Busuioc and Lodge 2016a, 2016b). 
The paper’s main research questions are as follows: 
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• What are the core symbols characterizing the reputation management of agencies in 
the societal security sector. More precisely, how do more specific symbols relate to 
different aspects, such as formal affiliation/control, collective/individually oriented 
goals, authoritative/service-oriented professional roles or legal framework? 
• What  is the relationship between these symbols and different accountability types? 
 First, this article considers the challenges of reputation management that public organizations  
in general face. Second, we offer a theoretically informed framework that links reputation 
management to the wider accountability literature. Third, we develop this framework with a 
particular focus on societal security. This is followed by an outline of the method and data 
used, a description of the main results and a discussion of the main use of reputation 
management and accountability types in this policy sector in three sub-sectors in five 
countries. 
Reputation management – definition, variety and challenges 
Organizational reputation is widely defined as “a set of beliefs about an organization’s 
capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of multiple 
audiences” (Carpenter 2010, 33). Leaders in a public agency attempt to invoke symbols and 
interpretations to appeal to diverse actors in their environment so as to build a reputation 
(Wæraas and Maor 2015, 4). These “networks of multiple audiences” include elected 
representatives, executive political and administrative leaders, interest groups, policy experts, 
the media and individual subjects. Reputation management involves issues about the core 
mission of an agency, reflecting on the agency’s historical path, its main resources and 
competences, and its outputs and outcomes. Success in “the presentation of self in everyday 
life” (Goffman 1959) does, however, not just depend on the agency’s own presentational 
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capacities, but also on how these activities are perceived by these ‘networks of multiple 
audiences’. 
A range of literatures have become increasingly interested in reputation. However, 
these literatures reflect different understandings regarding the rationality of actors and their 
degree of agency. A social constructivist perspective emphasizes that an agency's reputation 
reflects the combined result of the interaction between internal organizations behaviour and 
the social interaction between stakeholder groups. As a result, agencies have limited control 
over their own reputation (Power 2007). An institutional perspective would suggest that 
reputation is embedded in a larger macro-cultural context within which organizations operate 
(Fombrun 2012). Intermediary actors in organizational fields, for example, international 
organizations, global consulting firms, monitoring and certification organizations, the media, 
and non-governmental organizations, provide “objective” information (for example, rankings) 
that influence reputation management (Elsbach and Kramer 1996). This perspective overlaps 
with a more deterministic view that organizations are, to some extent, “prisoners of the 
environment”. Maor (2015, 17) suggests that the latter two perspectives “underestimate the 
abilities of public bodies to act adaptively, strategically, and opportunistically in developing a 
good reputation as well as maintaining and enhancing the stability of such reputation”. 
Accordingly, a political science approach to reputation management takes as a point of 
departure that “government agencies are generally rational and political conscious 
organizations” (Maor 2015, 5). This may mean either an economic or a more bounded 
rationality perspective (Rindova and Martins 2012, Simon 1957): “… their political 
principals, are often ‘reputation satisficers’, as opposed to ‘maximizers’"(Picci (2015, 39)). 
Across all literatures, reputation management reflects an understanding of agency 
behaviour that places autonomy seeking at the heart of the analysis. According to Carpenter 
and Krause (2012, 26 – and building on Wilson (1989) and a much longer tradition in 
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executive politics) - agencies are driven by the protection of their “turf” and, therefore, seek to 
establish a “protective shield” against hostile actors in the environment (Hood 2011 considers 
various ‘teflon-coating’ strategies more generally). Reputation management-related activities, 
therefore, have both a “defensive” component in the sense of seeking to proactively and 
reactively shuffle any blame side-, up- or downwards, but it also includes an “attacking” 
component in that these activities could be seen as attempts at influencing the content of the 
public policy, i.e. a strong reputation is a valuable political-administrative asset (Wæraas and 
Byrkjeflot 2012, 187).  
Following Carpenter (2010), an agency’s reputation can be divided into four 
dimensions: First, the performative dimension refers to the perception as to whether an 
agency is delivering on outputs and outcomes that relate to its core mission. Agency 
effectiveness and efficiency are notoriously difficult to assess, and become even more 
problematic when an agency’s outputs and outcomes are difficult to measure: Societal 
security is not a domain that is characterized by “production”-type agencies (Wilson 1990, 
159-63), and we return to this issue below. Second, the moral dimension reflects on the 
external perception as to whether an agency is viewed as ‘compassionate, flexible and honest’ 
(Carpenter and Krause 2012, 27), and is seen as protecting the interests of its clients, 
constituencies and members. This dimension has a cultural-institutional flavour to it (cf. 
Selznick 1957). Third, the procedural dimension has a formal instrumental focus and directs 
attention to whether an agency follows the appropriate procedural and legal requirements in 
its decision-making. Fourth, the technical dimension emphasizes professional capacities, 
knowledge and competences within an agency that are necessary to deal with complex tasks 
and environments. This dimension combines both instrumental and, arguably more 
importantly,  professional-cultural aspects. 
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The extent to which agencies are able to address any one of these four dimensions is 
contingent on both internal and external “networks of audiences”. Even if agencies are in a 
position to choose which dimension to emphasize or how to emphasize particular aspects 
(such as professional competence), these choices will reflect historical traditions, the agency’s 
core tasks, or concerns about blame and media headlines. Emphasizing solely one aspect of 
reputation may come at the expense of other organizational priorities (for example, in the 
context of higher education, an emphasis on “research excellence” leading to a neglect of 
teaching). In other words, prioritizing some external stakeholders over others and dealing with 
diversity of interests within an agency will influence priorities and require a balancing of 
considerations (Brunsson 1989). Reputation management-related activities will, therefore, on 
the one hand, seek to appeal to diverse audiences at the same time, and, on the other hand, 
seek to provide for distinct and targeted messages. Some agencies may be able to co-ordinate 
their messages, but others may be incapable of bridging the diverse reputational demands of 
their internal units (Røvik 2002). 
As noted, the management of reputation in light of competing demands and 
expectations from inside an organization and by the “networks of multiple audiences” poses a 
number of challenges. Following Wæraas and Byrkjeflot (2012, 193-200), five problems can 
be identified in particular. First, the politics problem suggests that agencies only have limited 
discretion as to the kind of “turf” they are able to occupy. Organizational missions and 
jurisdictions are mostly pre-determined at the higher political-administrative level, leaving 
agencies a constrained margin of discretion as to what activities to pursue with what kind of 
level of enthusiasm. In addition, it also means that agencies have to undertake inherently 
unpopular tasks, whether this is tax collection, prison services, or other “restrictive” activities. 
Furthermore, whether the “protective shield” lasts when the political heat is high and the 
media is calling for a sacrificial lamb in the context of scandal and disaster, is highly 
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questionable. Nevertheless, one of the intriguing questions in the context of reputation 
management is exactly why some agencies seem to be more able to withstand or deflect 
political pressure than others. 
Second, agencies also face a consistency problem. Given diverse objectives, tasks, 
(professional) cultures, and diverse career structures, agencies are unlikely to be able to 
develop one consistent message (Fombrun and Riel 2004). The inherently hybrid character of 
any agency means that reputation management is, ultimately, about the balancing of different 
interests and considerations. This, in turn, requires flexibility, ambiguity and ‘hypocrisy’, 
meaning that agencies might talk in one way, but then act in another. Such a path may be 
attractive to agency leaders faced by the challenges of consistency and legitimacy (Brunsson 
1989).  
Third, agencies also face a charisma problem. Most bureaucratic activities are unlikely 
to be well-received in an age of bureaucracy-bashing and general dissatisfaction with the state 
of public services (Picci 2015). In addition, many public activities, especially in societal 
security, involve “wicked issues” and “impossible jobs”. Such intractable problems are 
unlikely to generate a universally agreeable and stable solution. Such a context means that 
any agency will have difficulty in developing their reputation in terms of moral or 
performative dimensions, as any decision will always attract opposition and criticism.  
Fourth, agencies also face a uniqueness problem. Even though it is often alleged that 
the age of New Public Management has created specialized and disaggregated administrative 
bodies, the provision of public policies, such as societal security, is about co-production. 
Furthermore, external audiences do not usually bother acquiring a differentiated 
understanding of the constitutional arrangements and boundaries. This means that similarity 
rather than difference will be assumed (Ramirez 2006) and blame will not take the precise 
responsibility allocation into account (Baekkeskov 2016, Broekma 2016, Resodihardjo et al 
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2016). Finally, the hybrid nature of many agencies’ activities also means that any attempt at 
emphasizing uniqueness will generate internal conflict as it is seen as prioritizing one 
organizational objective over another (Wæraas and Byrkjeflot 2012, 198). Put together, any 
attempt at stressing uniqueness will prove difficult, the inherent overlap in societal security, 
and in other policy domains, is unavoidable.  
Finally, the excellence problem suggests that views about performance and excellence 
are inherently contested. For example, regardless of standing in national and international 
league tables, any agency that generates losers (a typical feature of redistributional politics) or 
encounters high profile failure is likely to be faced with criticism. Furthermore, as noted, 
excellence becomes even more difficult to establish when outputs and outcomes are hard to 
measure.  
Agencies, therefore, would ideally manage their reputation by persuading their 
audiences of their moral purpose, their procedural appropriateness, their technical expertise, 
and their successful performance. Unfortunately, in the real world, the moral purposes of 
agencies are disputed, procedural compliance is criticised as juridification, technical expertise 
is challenged and performance, at best, debated. This makes the study of reputation 
management of central interest for students of organizations; it offers insights not just into  
 
Table 1 Reputation and challenge for reputation management  
 Performative Moral Procedural Technical-
professional 
Politics Political benefits not 
aligned to agency per-
formance/blame mag-
net 
Inherent value con-
flicts 
Tension between pro-
cedural requirements 
and ‘responsiveness’ 
Conflict between elec-
toral and professional 
logics 
Consistency Incompatible objec-
tives 
Competing moral 
standards 
Appropriateness of 
procedures in diverse 
contexts 
Competing views 
about technical exper-
tise 
Charisma Impossible jobs  gen-
erate unpopularity 
Disputed legitimacy to 
exercise judgements 
Emphasizes co-
production and review 
Conflicts with under-
standings of egalitarian 
professional cultures 
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Uniqueness Inherent co-production 
of public policies 
Contested and organi-
zational overlap 
Procedural compliance 
reduces uniqueness  
Non-monopoly on 
technical expertise 
Excellence Competing standards 
of excellence 
Measurability contest-
ed/impossible 
Procedural compliance 
not valued/does not 
guarantee outputs/ 
outcomes  
Contestation as to 
what excellence in 
professional expertise 
implies 
 
 
 
 
how organizations seek to manage their reputation, but also how external audiences respond 
to these efforts. Ultimately, the study of these activities establishes critical insights for the 
study of legitimacy and bureaucratic authority (Carpenter 2002). Table 1 offers an overview 
and examples to illustrate the challenges across the different dimensions of reputation, as 
outlined by Carpenter (2010).  
There are obvious overlaps across dimensions; however, some key themes can be 
distinguished. The performance dimension raises problems in terms of measurability and 
contestation between different performative standards. The moral dimension raises questions 
about the wicked issue nature of particular policy challenges, and therefore points to the 
possibility that moral acceptance will never universally be granted. The procedural dimension 
highlights the tension between compliance and responsiveness and flexibility. It also points to 
the often questionable linkages between procedures and intended outputs and outcomes. 
Finally, the technical dimension points to disagreements as to what constitutes professional 
excellence.  
 
Social accountability and reputation management 
Managing an agency's reputation has direct linkages to questions about accountability, 
defined as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgments, 
and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007, 4-5). At the heart of accountability are 
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information, debate/interaction and consequence (Reichersdorfer, Christensen and Vrangbæk 
2013). The accountability-related literature has generated various kinds of typologies, usually 
using the “accountable to whom” question as device to generate different types of categories 
(Bovens 2007, Dubnick and Romzek 1987, Schillemans 2008). Agencies are faced with 
different accountability demands, whether it is towards political or administrative superiors, 
professional bodies or in light of (anticipated) judicial review. As part of their reputation 
management, agencies therefore have to perform balancing acts as to how to give account 
towards different audiences and their expectations. 
This article is concerned with the information part of giving account to the public at 
large, otherwise defined as “social accountability”. Such account-giving can be on the basis of 
formal requirements, such as the publication of annual reports, consultation papers and such 
like, or it can be based on informal understandings or the voluntary provision of information. 
In order to come to a better understanding as to how agencies seek to exercise social 
accountability, we utilize Carpenter’s dimensions of reputation and link these to different 
audiences. Agencies, in seeking to establish their reputation vis-à-vis the wider public (i.e. 
“social accountability”), will highlight different types of accountabilities. First, social 
accountability is likely to be directed at the “citizen” herself, namely how the agency is 
adding to the well-being of individuals. At the same time, we expect them to report on their 
“political accountability”, namely the ways they fit into the more general “ministerial 
accountability” chain towards parliamentary committees, ministers and the wider electorate 
(at least in liberal democracies) (Mulgan 2003). We also expect them to report on their 
“administrative and managerial accountability” in terms of their performance of managerial 
duties (Day and Klein 1987): this includes the publication of performance data (Van Dooren, 
Bouckaert and Halligan 2010), the release of inspection, audit and annual reports, as well as 
of procedural guidance. We expect agencies to report on their “professional accountability”, 
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whether it is in terms of their relationships to professional bodies, the existence of codes of 
conduct, or an emphasis on the professional qualifications (entry controls) that exist to enter a 
particular agency (Mulgan 2000). Finally, we expect reference to “legal accountability” in the 
sense of highlighting cases of judicial review and other compliance documents that highlight 
procedural appropriateness and the legality of administrative actions taken. Table 2 sums up 
our discussion. 
 
Table 2 Types of reputation and types of accountability 
 Performative Moral Procedural Technical-
professional 
Political X x x x 
Administrative X    
Managerial X    
Professional X x  X 
Judicial  x X  
Social X X   
 
 
 
 
 
Linking these different emphases in terms of account-giving to the earlier discussion of 
dimensions of reputation provides for clear areas of overlap and offers insights into potential 
variations. Whereas arguably all dimensions of reputation relate to each form of 
accountability, we expect that there are certain variations in emphasis. The performative 
dimension is related to most types of accountability, but the focus is on political 
accountability. At large, social accountability will be about establishing the moral dimension 
of reputation; however, to do so, any agency will seek to make reference to its other 
accountability relationships. The procedural dimension of reputation links primarily to 
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questions regarding legal accountability. Technical expertise related reputation links to 
professional accountability.   
Having highlighted how reputation management is likely to emphasize particular 
features and how social accountability is directly connected to issues of reputation 
management, and, in turn, is informed by different aspects of account-giving to different 
forums, it is now time to turn to our empirical discussion. How do agencies in societal 
security seek to manage their reputation by giving account of their activities to the world at 
large? 
 
Linking societal security to reputation management and accountability 
As noted, this article is interested in three domains that characterise the wider societal security 
set of government activities, namely intelligence, flood defence and food safety. The 
inclusion of these three domains might appear as controversial as, traditionally, issues of 
civilian protection (flood and food) have been kept separate from the mostly “law and order”-
related aspects of security. As noted already, while differences certainly persist, there has 
been a noticeable merger of these formerly separate fields over the past two decades (as 
evidenced, for example in the jurisdiction of the US Department of Homeland Security). 
Societal security related domains can therefore distinguished in terms of the type of tasks that 
are being performed, and in terms of general structural differences. We characterize societal 
security according to task specificity, features of the target population and the nature of the 
actual work (following Pollitt (2011) and Wilson (1989). This is illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Task-related characteristics in intelligence, food safety and flood protection  
 Intelligence Food safety Flood defence 
Visibility of output 
and outcome 
Low/Low High/Medium High/Medium 
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Political sensitivity High Medium (in non- 
incident time) 
Low (in non-incident 
time) 
Public resource 
commitment  
High High High 
Private sector presence Low High Low 
 
 
 
Source: Christensen and Lodge (2016) 
Table 3 suggests that all the three sub-sectors in societal security are characterized by high 
public resource commitments, while differing on other features. Intelligence is defined by low 
visibility in terms of output and outcome and scores highly on political sensitivity; food 
security is characterized by medium political sensitivity during non-incident times and high 
on private sector presence; while flooding security features low political sensitivity (during 
‘normal’ times) and also low private presence. 
Concerning structural dimensions, we distinguish between vertical/horizontal 
specialization and intra-public sector/external specialization between public and private 
sector, with related coordination (Egeberg 2012). Combining the two dimensions creates four 
categories that have implications for reputation management: First, the vertical intra-public 
sector type could range from very centralized to very decentralized organizational solutions of 
societal security. Overall, intelligence organizations in most countries are the most 
centralized, food safety often usually combines a central agency with local authority 
inspections, decentralized laboratories and branches, while flood defence is often based on the 
regional and local level, with some functions located at the central government level.
1
  
Second, horizontal specialization among public organizations ranges from the 
                                                 
1
 In our study we focus on agencies at the central level of government working with flood safety, most of them 
sharing responsibility with regional and local authorities. While this is therefore a necessarily partial study that 
has to take into consideration different jurisdictional competencies, the study nevertheless should nevertheless 
highlight the reputuational considerations of these organisations more generally. 
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presence of “stand-alone” agencies to arrangements characterized by overlapping 
organizations. Typically, the intelligence area is characterized by a variety of military, civilian 
and mixed organizations; food safety brings together organizations from the fields of 
agriculture, fisheries, health and consumers; while flood protection combines environmental 
and economic aspects as well as regional and/or local actors from technical, police and fire 
services. 
 Third, vertical specialization and collaboration with private actors indicates that public 
authorities are supposedly directing the process in terms of contractualized relationships with 
the private sector, often also involving competitive bidding and other quasi-market 
arrangements. Food safety is probably the sub-field that relies most on private actor 
involvement, for example, by a reliance on private laboratories. Some outsourcing is also 
evident in flood defence. Intelligence may also involve some collaborations with the private 
sector (such as in the area of cyber-security), but these are rarely reported upon.  
Fourth, horizontal specialization and collaboration between public and private points 
to a broad dispersion of authority across actors without clear lines of hierarchy. Such 
relationships are not often observed in the area of societal security (at least not in our sample), 
but some areas, for example para-public flood defence networks, may be said to represent 
such arrangements.  
These broad characteristics establish a number of expectations as to what kind of 
empirical patterns should be observed when exploring the reputation-related activities in 
social accountability of agencies in societal security.  
First of all, we expect that intelligence will be characterized by a strong emphasis on political 
accountability, namely that activities are under democratic control, and on legal 
accountability, namely that activities follow procedural provisions. There will be some 
emphasis on prevention in terms of performance, but as “success” is difficult to measure, we 
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expect a limited emphasis on this dimension. We also expect some emphasis on the expertise 
situated within intelligence bodies. In other words, there will be an assertion of the technical 
competence and the moral importance of intelligence work in order to promote liberal 
democratic values and “security”. 
Second, food safety is expected to be characterized by a stronger emphasis on 
performance, for example, by publishing inspection reports/tables. Furthermore, there will be 
an emphasis on the technical expertise and procedural appropriateness of inspections and 
licensing decisions. Following the BSE (mad cow) scandal, we also expect a degree of 
emphasis on openness of decision-making. We expect less emphasis in terms of political, 
judicial or administrative oversight; the overall emphasis is, we expect, on the protection of 
the integrity of the food chain and societal safety. 
Third, we expect that the area of flood defence is characterized by a strong emphasis 
on technical expertise as well as some procedural provisions in order to justify particular 
decisions. There will be an emphasis on “performance” in terms of reports on flooding 
incidents and forecasting of future demands. However, we expect most of the direction of 
account-giving to be directed at society at large, providing information about flood maps and 
protective methods with less emphasis on elements of political, legal or administrative/ 
managerial accountability. 
 
Table 4 Expectations for reputation and accountability in sectors of societal security 
 
 Intelligence Food safety Flood defence Empirical indica-
tors 
Performative 
reputation  
Low overall High on 
prevention/ protec-
tion 
High on 
prevention/ protec-
tion 
Core symbols used 
focusing activities – 
output and outcomes 
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Moral reputa-
tion 
High on collective 
symbols. 
Medium/low on 
openness etc. 
High on balancing 
collective and 
individual symbols. 
High on openness, 
etc. 
High on collective 
symbols. 
Medium/low on 
openness, etc. 
Core symbols used 
focusing openness, 
honesty, trust and 
caring. 
Collective/individual 
symbols 
Procedural rep-
utation  
High overall High/medium overall Medium/low over-
all 
Core symbols stating 
judicial aspects. 
Symbols of legal 
framework for 
activities 
Technical/ 
professional 
reputation 
High on professional 
quality. 
Medium on 
professional regula-
tion and 
advice 
High on both Medium/low on 
both 
Core symbols used 
focusing independent 
expertise and 
professional quality. 
Symbols of 
professional regula-
tion and advice 
Political-
administrative 
landscape 
High on control Low on vertical con-
trol 
Low on vertical 
control 
Symbols of vertical 
control 
Accountability 
emphasis 
Emphasis on politi-
cal/legal accountabil-
ity to show commit-
ment to liberal de-
mocracy 
Emphasis on infor-
mation to population 
‘at large’, some ad-
ministrative account-
ability to report on 
responsibilities and 
professional ac-
countability to high-
light expertise, less 
on political or legal 
accountability 
Emphasis on in-
formation to gen-
eral population, 
emphasis on pro-
fessional adminis-
trative accountabil-
ity, less on politi-
cal and judicial 
accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
In order to assess the way in which agencies are seeking to manage their reputation, we 
explore the symbols on the various agencies’ websites and suggest that these highlight the key 
ways in which these agencies seek to portray themselves. This is in the literature variably 
labeled as mission-statements, branding, self-presentation, and such like (Wæraas and Maor 
2015). Of course, websites can change quickly in light of different fashions in web design or 
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incidents requiring responses. However, they nevertheless highlight key dimensions of agency 
reputation management activities - they are also arguably the first point of contact that 
citizens (and individuals from other countries). Websites are part of soft “soft power” of the 
state. In line with Table 4, we relate the content of websites to six aspects, namely whether the 
core symbols employed on the website refer to performance/security, to constitutional norms 
and core values, to legal procedures, to professionalism, and emphasis in terms of type of 
accountability. In addition, we also focus on the description of the agency’s embeddedness 
within the political-administrative landscape. Table 5 summarises the coding scheme.   
 
Table 5 Coding scheme 
Dimension Scoring 
Performative Reference to output/outcomes 
No reference 
Moral Collective symbols 
Individual symbols 
Balance collective/individual 
None 
Procedural Reference to ‘due process’ 
No reference to ‘due process’  
Technical/professional Reference to professional regulation 
Reference to advice & guidance 
Reference to both 
None 
Placing in political-administrative landscape Control 
Autonomy 
Mixed 
None 
Accountability emphasis Political 
Administrative and managerial 
Legal 
Professional 
Social (at large) 
 
 
 
 
 We started from the main homepage of the organizations studied, during the same 
month (February 2015) and made one click on the headlines to further look into how they 
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presented themselves in different areas (mission statements, tasks, legal basis, history, etc.).  
We followed the web-design principle that any information should be obtainable within three 
clicks. Using three clicks as a measure follows principles of good web-design that suggest 
that any site-user will lose interest after three clicks. In other words, if the information cannot 
be found within three clicks, it might as well not exist. We then performed a qualitative 
assessment in accordance with the dimensions in table by scoring findings in terms of high, 
medium and low. A low score was allocated where websites did not contain reputation 
symbols related to the different dimensions. A medium score was given when the dimension 
was addressed but in no major detail. A high score was given where dimensions were 
addressed with considerable content. In those sectors which are occupied by more than one 
agency (this was especially the case in intelligence), we include all organizations in that 
domain.  The co-author with strength in a particular language undertook the primary 
assessment, all results were subsequently moderated between the co-authors so as to ensure 
consistency between the two authors and country findings. 
In the following, we utilise this coding scheme in the context of three domains, 
intelligence services, flood protection and food safety. The choice of countries reflects a  
degree of variety of state traditions within the North-Western European context. Partly our 
choice of country is driven by language capability, partly the choice is theoretically informed. 
After all, Scandinavia is commonly held to score highly in terms of transparency, whereas the 
UK represents a case of transparency driven by decades of managerialist reform. The German 
example offers a case of a European continental administration that has arguably been least 
exposed to demands for transparency. Apart from this variety generation, there are also some 
important shared similarities: the agencies are all part of EU-frameworks and they are 
exposed to each other (if only through neighbourhood effects). Nevertheless, it is likely that 
they will display some difference, based on national particularities, such as constitutional 
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arrangements, history or particular national incidents.  
Table 6 Overview of number of societal security organisations 
 UK Germany Norway Sweden Denmark 
Intelligence 5 3 3 3 3 
Food 1 3 1 1 1 
Flood defence 1 1 1 1 1 
 
 
 
Results 
Table 7 summaries the findings. In this section we briefly summarise the different countries. 
Norway. First, the profile of the three sectors shows variety in terms of their emphasis on 
performance and political accountability. The food agency provides most information on 
output and outcomes. This is followed by flood defence, with intelligence scoring lowest. 
Nevertheless, the intelligence services engage in public information provision and use social 
media. The Norwegian Police Security Service, one of three actors in the intelligence sector, 
stresses that its activities are controlled by the government, while the food safety domain is 
characterised by an emphasis on autonomy. Table 2 above suggested that the performative 
dimension of reputation management can be linked to a number of accountability types. This 
variety of potential audiences is also evidence in the Norwegian case. We find traces of this in 
the core symbols given – in intelligence we find the general and strong symbols of “protect 
the independence of the state” and “resilient society”, in food safety elements of managerial 
and social accountability, and in flood defence elements of professional accountability. 
Second, the moral reputation dimension shows a less varied picture among the sectors. 
Food safety scores by far the highest. The core symbols highlight that the agency is “open, 
giving, dedicated and trustworthy”, stressing both collective (“protection of the state”) and 
individual symbols, suggesting that individuals need to be protected, but that they are also 
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responsible for their own lifestyle choices. Intelligence-related agencies are broadly similar, 
they score low in terms of openness. They stress collective symbols, but also seek to appeal to 
individuals in terms of their potential contribution to add to general security. Third, there is 
limited variation in terms of procedural reputation across the three sectors. They are all  
 
Table 7 Reputation, accountability in three societal security sectors in five countries 
 Intelligence Food safety Flood defence 
Performative reputation Norway: medium – 
some information on 
staff, budget and risk 
 
Sweden: medium – 
some information on 
staff, budget and risk 
Denmark: medium – 
some information on 
staff, budget and risk 
UK: low - limited 
information apart 
from risk profile 
 
Germany: low - lim-
ited information apart 
from risks/threats 
Norway: high – in-
formation on all 
aspects of activities 
 
Sweden: high – in-
formation on all 
aspects of activities 
Denmark: high – 
information on all 
aspects of activities 
UK: high - infor-
mation on products 
and inspections 
Germany: medi-
um/low - some in-
formation about 
products 
Norway: 
high/medium – quite 
a lot of information 
on risks and local 
conditions 
Sweden: medium –  
some information on 
risks 
Denmark – medium/ 
low – selected infor-
mation on risks 
UK: medium - limited 
information on flood 
risks 
 
Germany: limited. 
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Moral reputation Norway: medium 
overall – more 
collective than 
individual symbols 
 
Sweden: medium/high 
– mixed collective 
and 
individual symbols 
 
Denmark: high/ 
medium – more 
collective than 
individual symbols 
UK: medium/high - 
collective and indi-
vidual symbols  
 
Germany: medium - 
collective and indi-
vidual symbols 
Norway: high 
overall – focus on 
trust, food safety 
and protective com-
petence 
Sweden: medium/ 
low – more individ-
ual than collective 
symbols 
Denmark: high/ 
medium – more 
collective than 
individual  
UK: high - stress on 
importance of good 
governance and 
food safety 
Germany: medium - 
stress on integrity of 
food chain 
Norway: medi-
um/high – high on 
collective 
symbols, focusing 
vulnerability 
 
Sweden: medium/low 
– mostly individual 
symbols, advice for 
individual choice 
Denmark – medium/ 
low – mostly 
collective, coordina-
tion symbols 
UK: medium - im-
portance of protection 
and life- style. 
Germany: medium - 
importance of protec-
tion of ecology and 
individual life-style 
Procedural reputation Norway: medium 
Sweden: high/medium 
– mentioned in core 
Denmark – medium 
UK: medium - refer-
ence to legal provi-
sions 
Germany: high - 
strong emphasis on 
legality and constitu-
tional basis 
Norway: medium 
Sweden: medium 
 
Denmark – medium 
UK: high - stress on 
‘good governance’ 
 
Germany – medium 
- appropriateness of 
provisions 
Norway: medium 
Sweden:  medium 
 
Denmark – medium 
UK: medium - not 
many core symbols 
 
Germany: medium - 
stress on co-
ordination function 
Technical/professional 
reputation 
Norway: medium –  
mixed regulation and 
advice 
Sweden: medium – 
mixed regulation and 
advice 
Denmark: high – in 
core symbols. more 
regulation than advice 
 
UK: high - stress on 
expertise in detection 
 
Germany: medium - 
stress on norms 
Norway: high –  
mixed regulation 
and advice 
Sweden: high – both 
in core and mixing 
regulation and ad-
vice 
Denmark: high – in 
core symbols, 
balancing regulation 
and advice 
UK: high - emphasis 
on expertise 
 
Germany: high - 
emphasis on exper-
tise 
Norway: high – in 
core, mixed 
regulation and advice 
Sweden: medium/low 
– mostly advice 
 
Denmark – high/ 
medium – in core 
symbols, mostly 
advice 
UK: medium - em-
phasis on  protection 
 
Germany: medium - 
emphasis on co-
ordination 
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Political-administrative 
landscape 
Norway: high overall 
- more control then 
autonomy 
Sweden: high/medium 
– mixed control and 
autonomy 
 
Denmark: medium – 
more autonomy than 
control  
 
UK: medium - stress 
on autonomy and 
control 
 
 
Germany: high - 
stress on control over 
autonomy 
Norway: medium - 
focus on autonomy 
 
Sweden: medium/ 
high – more 
autonomy than 
control 
Denmark: medium – 
focusing autonomy 
 
 
UK: medium - bal-
ance between au-
tonomy and control 
 
Germany: low - on 
autonomy/control - 
part of overall 
framework 
Norway: high/ 
medium – mixed 
control and autonomy 
Sweden: medium –  
mostly autonomy 
 
 
Denmark – high/ 
medium – more 
autonomy than 
control 
UK - medium - con-
trol more dominant 
than autonomy 
 
Germany: medium - 
mixed but overall no 
clear dominant trend 
Accountability emphasis  Norway – emphasis 
on political accounta-
bility 
 
 
Sweden – emphasis 
on social and judicial 
accountability 
 
Denmark – mixing 
social and profession-
al accountability 
 
UK - emphasis on 
political accountabil-
ity 
 
 
Germany - emphasis 
on legal accountabil-
ity 
Norway - mixing 
social and profes-
sional accountability 
Sweden - mixing 
social and profes-
sional accountability 
Denmark – mixing 
social and profes-
sional accountability 
UK - emphasis on 
‘user’ (social ac-
countability) - no 
other emphasis  
Germany - emphasis 
on user and admin-
istrative accounta-
bility (jurisdiction) 
Norway – mixing po-
litical, social and pro-
fessional accountabil-
ity 
Sweden – mixing all 
forms of accountabil-
ity 
 
 
Denmark – mixing 
political and profes-
sional accountability 
UK -  emphasis on 
general information - 
includes all forms of 
accountability 
Germany - emphasis 
on administrative ac-
countability (jurisdic-
tion) 
 
 
 
 
scoring medium, meaning that none of them mention this aspect among their core symbols. 
All stress the symbols of the legal framework and list international and national acts and 
codes of conduct for their activities. Fourth, the display of technical/professional reputation 
varies somewhat among the sectors. Food safety and flood defence safety score highest; food 
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safety by stressing the combination of professionally-based reputation and advice, while in 
flood defence independent expertise and advice are being stressed. The intelligence services 
stress regulation, but also information, advice and guidance. The accountability emphasis also 
varies among the different sectors, with intelligence narrowly emphasizing political 
accountability, while the other two sectors display a more varied pattern, namely by mixing 
social and professional accountability. 
Sweden. The observed variation across sectors on the performance dimension follows 
that observed in Norway. Autonomy features prominently across the Swedish agencies which 
is reflecting the long tradition of strong autonomy for agencies (Premfors 1998). Concerning 
moral reputation, there is variety, with intelligence scoring highest on collective symbols, 
while flood defence emphasizes individual aspects the most. Overall, Sweden is scoring 
higher on individual moral symbols than Norway. This may reflect a higher level of adoption 
of NPM-related themes (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). There is a broad similarly across the 
sectors when it comes to procedural reputation management. In terms of professional 
reputation management, food safety scores highly when considering the emphasis on advice 
and control activities; while flood defence scores highly in terms of advice function alone, 
which shows more of an individual focus than Norway. Sweden has a broader profile with 
regards to accountability emphasis than Norway, this means that different forms are mixed. 
Overall, social accountability is most prominent – agencies address the public at large. 
Denmark. Across the three sectors, there are hardly any differences in terms of the 
performance and the “landscape” dimension, which is similar to Sweden. In contrast to 
Norway, there is, overall, a stronger emphasis on autonomy, again, similar to Sweden. 
Concerning scores for moral reputation, intelligence and food safety score high to medium, 
meaning that they stress moral symbols in the core symbols. In doing so, they score higher 
than agencies in Norway and Sweden. However, they (similar to Norwegian agencies)  mostly 
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focus on collective symbols and put far less weight on individual ones. As in Norway and 
Sweden, the three sectors show little variation and do not mention procedural reputation 
symbols among their core symbols. They do, however, stress several of the judicial 
frameworks that guide their activities. Finally, the overall scores for technical/professional 
reputation are high for the three sectors, meaning that they play a prominent part among the 
core symbols, which is a higher score overall than in Norway and Sweden. Concerning their 
symbols related to accountability emphasis, Denmark has the same mixed profile as Sweden. 
 UK. The design of the website already suggests differences in accountability 
structures. Whereas food and intelligence sectors could (still) rely on their own web design, 
the Environment Agency (flood defence) has been incorporated into the overall central 
government website design. This means that it has no separate identity to other government 
agencies. More generally, the pattern in the UK follows those of the Scandinavian countries. 
In terms of performance, there is largely “customer” advice in the areas of flood defence 
(flood maps) and food safety, and some broad threat level indications among the intelligence 
services. The moral reputation dimension varies between the ‘interests of the government’ and 
‘protection’ (in the case of intelligence) to the more generic issues such as the protection of 
individuals from harm (due to flooding or food related disease). The food sector is also 
characterized by an emphasis on procedural reputation management, reflecting the concern 
with “good governance” following the BSE scandal in the late 1990s. The intelligence 
services highlight their basis on legal sources. In terms of placing in the political-
administrative landscape, the intelligence services highlight their linkages to the political 
executive, the environment agency to its respective ministry, whereas the food standards 
authority seeks to signal its autonomy.  
 Germany.  The ability to freely emphasise certain themes is severely constrained by 
the existence of federalism. As a result, agencies in food safety and flood protection have to 
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highlight their co-ordinative function in a wider system of control. This also means that in 
terms of accountability, their emphasis is on their legal basis and their linkages to federal 
ministries. The intelligence services stress the importance of their legal basis. Closely 
connected is a strong emphasis on a commitment to the constitutional order and the protection 
of individual and collective security. The food area is arguably the one sector with some 
emphasis on performance as it provides information on particular goods. Each sector stresses 
technical competence.  
Discussion 
This article focuses on the ways in which different agencies seek to manage their reputation 
by projecting a certain image of their work to a wider audience. Some patterns emerge which 
cannot be explained by reference to constitutional differences alone. Somewhat 
unsurprisingly, intelligence emerges as sector which stresses in particular the control by 
elected politicians and the legal basis of their activities. There is also an appeal to collective 
and individual symbols by stressing the importance of security and maintaining the integrity 
of the state. The sectors of food safety and flood defence display certain degrees of autonomy, 
but cross-national variation exists (Elvbakken et al. 2008). Broadly, the variations across 
sectors operate in similar ways, suggesting that ‘task’ is an important aspect in shaping the 
ways in which agencies seek to manage their reputation (Pollitt et al. 2004).  
 Returning to our expectations as formulated in Table 4, our initial expectations are not 
completely out of line with the observed patterns (Table 8). If anything, our expectation was 
that we would observe less extensive reputation management on certain dimensions. For 
example, despite the difficulties in “measuring” outputs and outcomes, intelligence services 
across all countries seek to enhance their performative reputation. We expected all agencies to 
highlight their moral dimensions, but to reflect difference in the way they stress individual 
and collective symbols. Across all sectors, collective symbols are being stressed, while food 
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safety, and to a lesser extent also flood defence, offer degrees of individual symbols as well. 
In terms of moral reputation, each agency appeals through a mixture of collective and 
individual symbols. Intelligence usually refers to collective “protection of the state” symbols, 
food and flood sectors are noticeable for their mixture in terms of referring to both collective 
and individual symbols, alluding both to regulation and personal concerns.   
 
Table 8 Expectations and findings compared 
 Intelligence Food safety Flood defence 
Performative reputation  Low overall 
 
 
Medium/low 
High on 
prevention/ protection. 
 
High 
High on 
prevention/ protection 
 
Medium 
Moral reputation High on collective 
symbols. 
Medium/low on 
openness etc. 
 
Medium/high 
High on balancing 
collective and 
individual symbols. 
High on openness, 
etc. 
 
High/medium 
High on collective 
symbols. 
Medium/low on 
openness, etc. 
 
Medium 
Procedural reputation  High overall 
 
Medium/high 
High/medium overall 
 
Medium 
Medium/low overall 
 
Medium 
Technical/ 
professional reputation  
High on 
professional quality. 
Medium on 
professional regulation 
and advice 
 
Medium/high 
High on both 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Medium/low on both 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium/high 
Political-administrative 
landscape 
High on control 
 
High/medium 
Low on vertical control 
 
Medium 
Low on vertical control 
 
Medium/high 
Accountability emphasis Emphasis on politi-
cal/legal accountability 
to show commitment to 
liberal democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed – political and 
legal strongest 
Emphasis on information to 
population ‘at large’, some 
administrative accountabil-
ity to report on responsi-
bilities and professional 
accountability to highlight 
expertise, less on political 
or legal accountability 
 
Professional and social 
strongest 
Emphasis on information 
to general population, 
emphasis on professional 
administrative accounta-
bility, less on political 
and judicial accountabil-
ity 
 
 
 
Mixing most forms 
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Somewhat less prominent is the procedural dimension of reputation management. Arguably, 
this is the one dimension that is highly prominent during times of blame and crisis as agencies 
seek to absolve themselves from blame by denying their responsibility or by stressing their 
appropriate procedural approach (see Hood 2011). It is noticeable that the main theme 
emerging from our approach is the emphasis on the procedural safeguards that constrain 
agencies. This plays a particular role in the case of intelligence services. In food, the UK 
might be particularly prominent as one of the rationales for regulatory reform in food safety 
was to enhance transparency in regulatory decision-making following the BSE scandal 
(Rothstein 2004).  
Finally, all three sectors point to attempts at highlighting the technical competency of 
the agencies involved. In sum, therefore, across the four dimensions of reputation dimensions, 
agencies generally emphasise themes of professional/technical expertise and moral purpose. 
This finding may have to do with the medium, the website, as it lends itself more to a display 
of broad messages rather than detailed accounts of procedural appropriateness of performance 
related debates, especially as the latter are problematic in the light of lacking output/outcome 
measurements.  
These broad patterns and the variations within them relate also to the key theme in 
terms of overall accountability emphasis. Intelligence services highlight their embeddedness 
within wider networks of detection and enforcement, whereas food safety and flood defence 
do mention their place in the political-administrative rank order (and more so than we initially 
expected). However, when it comes to an emphasis on different accountability relationships, 
only intelligence stresses the importance of accountability to politics and law, food safety 
stresses the importance of accounting to the customer (via warnings, inspection reports, 
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advice), whereas flood defence is broadly similar to food safety but is less “consumer-
focused” as its “product” is different. In other words, we find that task does matter, the way 
agencies are displaying their activities is shaped by their constitutional context, but, 
ultimately, the activity itself is more important in explaining why agencies display more 
attention to some dimensions of reputation management than others.  
Among the task-related characteristics, it seems to be political sensitivity and, more 
importantly, the visibility of outputs and outcomes which account for the way in which 
agencies give account of their activities on their websites. In addition, political sensitivity can 
play out in different ways – whereas in the case of intelligence services, this relates to a 
potential lack of trust in secretive activities, in the case of food safety, this relates to 
contaminated food and other forms of food-borne illnesses, but also a legacy of governance 
failure in the late 1990s (BSE). Such issues do not arise in flood defence to the same degree, 
despite episodes of heightened political heat over prolonged flooding or disputes about 
insurance arrangements (Rothstein et al 2013).  
When looking at cross-national variation, some differences emerge. In the context of 
Scandinavia, there are small differences across the countries. The main difference relates to 
the intelligence domain and the degree of emphasis in terms of autonomy or control. Norway, 
in contrast to Sweden and Denmark, stresses “control”. This is counter-intuitive in terms of 
wider debates where Danish administration is seen as a more closely integrated system than 
Norway (Arter 2008); however, this pattern may be related to the heightened political salience 
of this domain in the context of the atrocities committed by Anders Behring Breivik in 2011 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2015). German agencies outside intelligence are bound by their 
coordinative functions. Across all three sectors, there is a balance between control and 
autonomy from federal ministries. It is, furthermore, noticeable, that German agencies display 
their legal procedural provisions more prominently than other countries. The variations within 
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the UK reflect the trend over the past decade or so of ‘returning’ agencies to central 
departmental control, as displayed in the case of the Environment Agency. Its re-integration 
in the overall government website structure highlights not just an emphasis on cost-savings in 
central government, but a wider ambition to destroy organisational distinctiveness. Overall, 
variations here reflect mostly the legal competence of the different agencies; with the 
intelligence services in Germany seeking to highlight their legality in particular which is 
likely to be a response to contemporary concern about their activities in view of right-wing 
extremism and co-operation with US intelligence agencies. Overall, however, it is difficult to 
point to any distinct national patterns; the sectoral similarities across countries are more 
similar than the national similarities across sectors. If there are national distinct elements, 
such as the Norwegian intelligence domain, or the UK’s food safety and flood defence 
domains, then these emerge from distinct sectoral logics, most likely in response to severe 
(national) incidents.   
Conclusion 
Reputation management is usually associated with moments of crisis or strain. Agency 
behaviour is studied when things are going wrong, blame is being shuffled around and actors 
seek to protect their turf (Hood 2011). Our study has taken a different approach - it has argued 
that reputation management to the world at large can be studied through the study of websites 
of government agencies. These websites might be temporary phenomena, but they 
nevertheless reflect the key interests and emphases that shape organisational attention. This 
article therefore has added to the literature about reputation management by agencies in a 
number of ways (see also Busuioc 2015, Gilad 2015, Busuioc and Lodge 2015, 2016).  
First, it has taken further the interest in reputation management in government by 
focusing on a different area, namely websites. By enquiring into the symbols they place on 
their website, we are interested in the ways they exercise social accountability. We therefore 
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did not search for particular documents or statements, but were guided by the websites. We 
have also noted how problematic reputation management in government is. Most existing 
studies explore agencies on their own. This study has taken the domain as a unit and therefore 
acknowledged that agencies are inter-dependent. Websites are, of course, only one way of 
assessing reputation management - appearing in front of parliamentary committee, dealing 
with the (social) media, and other activities also belong to wider reputation management 
activities. However, we suggest that in the contemporary age, the first contact between citizen 
and state is via the website, and therefore the agency's presentation on a website offers 
important insights into the way in which agencies seek to present themselves.  
Second, this article has also brought together the literatures in reputation management 
and accountability, noting potential ways in which particular aspects of reputation 
management are central in account-giving to some forums rather than others. In this study, the 
focus has been on social accountability, namely the way in which agencies communicate to 
the public at large. However, this form of account-giving can also include evidence of how 
agencies give account to other audiences (forums). We found this to be particularly the case in 
the area of intelligence, which is, in itself, not surprising in terms of the task specificity of this 
domain and the ongoing concerns (and scandals) regarding the secretive work of intelligence 
services.  
Third, this article has advanced a task-related set of expectations as to how agencies  
manage their reputation. Given certain characteristics (salience, measurability of outputs and 
outcomes), agencies are able to promote some aspects rather than others. We found that in 
terms of social account-giving on websites, agencies, across sectors and national jurisdictions, 
emphasise moral and technical competence. In terms of moral reputation, differences, 
however, exist between those agencies that point to the collective rather than individual 
symbols. Here, again, the difference can be explained by the nature of tasks.  
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  Furthermore, the article has also added to the study of societal security. It brings 
together insights from different sectors and highlights points of commonality. After all, these 
are sectors in which transparency and accountability represent a “wicked issue” in itself - 
some aspects of decision-making are supposed to operate ‘in secret’ so as to allow for the 
effective operation of certain activities (such as ‘counter-terrorism’). How to hold agencies 
that are supposed to be non-transparent in some of their core activities accountable has been a 
long-standing debate in public administration, and understanding better how these agencies 
seek to establish a reputation to appear accountable can therefore add to our understanding 
about the actual accountability of these agencies that are at the heart of societal security. 
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